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THE IRREPRESSIBILITY OF PRECEDENT*
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT**
In this Article, I discuss three important ways in which precedent
still matters in constitutional law in spite of some empirical data
and normative critiques suggesting otherwise. First, I describe
how precedent shapes the Court's institutional practices and
secures basic stability in constitutional adjudication. In fact, the
Court not only leaves the overwhelming bulk of its prior
decisions intact, but also steadfastly employs precedent as the
most popular basis for its decisions and mode of argumentation.
Second, I describe how the Justices have employed precedents in
particular cases during the first two Terms of the Roberts Court.
Although the Roberts Court has not yet formally overruled any
constitutional precedents, its track record thus far demonstrates
the extremely weak constraining force of particular decisions on
the path of the Court's constitutional decisionmaking. Third, I
suggest a normative defense of precedent in response to the
critique that precedent provides a weak if not illegitimate basis
for the Court's constitutional decisionmaking. Precedent
provides an independent, neutral source on which Justices may
constrain or avoid reliance on their personal or political
preferences.
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INTRODUCTION
The most remarkable fact about the Roberts Court's handling of
constitutional precedents in its first two Terms is that it was
unremarkable. It was unremarkable because it merely tracked the
Court's historic patterns in deploying, deferring to, and manipulating
constitutional precedents. Yet, this unremarkable fact merits special
attention because it is the proverbial dog that did not bark in the
night': it reveals that the role of precedent in constitutional
adjudication over the past two years was no different than it has been
for more than a century.
In this Article, I will illustrate how, in its first two Terms, the
Roberts Court's jurisprudence reflected an essential dynamic in
constitutional adjudication, a dynamic that persists in spite of shifts in
the ideological composition of the Court. This dynamic is the duality
of precedent, which entails its simultaneous functioning at both macro
and micro levels in constitutional adjudication. In other words,
precedent functions, inter alia, as both a durable source of
argumentation and authority across cases, over time, and as
particular, prior decisions whose authority and meaning are at issue in
specific constitutional disputes. This duality of precedent helps to
explain why on one level constitutional law is relatively stable, while
on another level-closer to the ground, so to speak-it can appear to
observers as if there were a great deal of flux in particular areas of
constitutional doctrine. This Article aims to show that the duality of
precedent is a constant phenomenon in constitutional law and that it
is no contradiction for precedent to operate simultaneously as
shaping the Court as an institution and as sources of decision within
individual constitutional disputes.
In each Part, this Article shows a different way in which the basic
duality of precedent is evident. In Part I, I examine precedent from
the perspective of historical institutionalism, a perspective which
focuses on historic patterns in the Court's decisionmaking over time,
and not just on the aggregation of the individual votes of the Justices
in particular cases.' An institutionalist perspective suggests, perhaps
contrary to the expectations of many, that there is relative stability in
constitutional doctrine. There are, in fact, only a few discrete areas in
1. See SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK
HOLMES 335, 349 (1927) (referring to the significance of the fact that the "dog did not
bark").
2. On historical institutionalism as a perspective on constitutional law, see generally
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, at xviii-xix, 2-3 (2003).
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which the Court is shifting or modifying its case law at any given time.
Even within these areas, shifts in doctrine are often modest rather
than radical. Moreover, precedent is an enduring modality of
constitutional argumentation. Indeed, it has long been the single
most popular source of constitutional authority on which the Court
relies.
In Part II, I shift my perspective from historical institutionalism
to a case-by-case analysis of the Roberts Court's handling of
precedent. From this perspective, it is evident that particular
constitutional precedents generate little path dependency-that is,
they impose very little constraint on the choices of individual Justices
in individual constitutional disputes. While some scholars would
prefer that the Roberts Court had reached more liberal outcomes or
construed some precedents more liberally than it did,3 they fail to
account for the multiple factors precluding most constitutional
precedents from generating relatively strong path dependency in
constitutional adjudication. Among the most important of these
factors is the extent to which a particular precedent has been cited
with approval or disapproval in constitutional adjudication, an aspect
of what I believe are its network effects. In fact, the precedents which
have provided the least constraint on the Roberts Court have been
cited with quite minimal or no approval by the Court in prior cases.
Even older precedents often lack the potency to constrain the Justices
from doing what they please unless they have been cited with so much
approval for so long that their meaning or significance has been fixed
or entrenched in constitutional law.
In the third and final Part, I shift to a normative perspective. I
suggest that the doctrine of constitutional stare decisis has the virtue
of facilitating the constitutional ideal of judicial restraint. Fidelity to
precedent-particularly prior decisions whose network effects are
relatively extensive-allows the Justices to ground their decisions on
a lawful source of authority independent from their personal
preferences. This is especially true for Justices who profess to be
committed to judicial modesty, which requires respecting the
judgments of others.
3. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, On the Wrong Side of 5 to 4, Liberals Talk Tactics,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2007, § 4, at 3 (describing liberal scholars' reactions to several Roberts
Court's decisions, including Cass Sunstein's plea for the Court's liberals to express "a
more heroic vision").
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I. THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON PRECEDENT
An institutional perspective differs from the popular method of
social scientists merely to aggregate the individual votes of the
Justices in particular cases. This institutional analysis measures the
historical patterns in the functioning of precedent, including how it
facilitates stability, in constitutional adjudication over time.4
There are three particularly noteworthy patterns. First, a survey
of the 133 cases in which the Court has expressly overruled itself'
indicates that the Court overrules constitutional precedents in some
areas more than in others.6 In particular, the areas in which the Court
has overruled itself six or more times are criminal procedure (forty),
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause (nineteen), the
Commerce Clause (eighteen), Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause (eight), Eleventh Amendment (seven), Article I
other than Commerce Clause (six), and freedom of expression or
speech (six). 7 The Court has overruled itself fewer than six times in
other areas of constitutional law. This suggests, inter alia, that most
areas of constitutional law have had relatively few of the sharpest,
most extreme shifts in constitutional law-namely, explicit
overrulings.
In its first two Terms, the Roberts Court did not, however,
overrule a single constitutional case. One would have to go back to
the early Warren Court to find the last time the Supreme Court went
a whole Term without overruling at least one constitutional
precedent.8 Moreover, neither of the Court's two newest Justices-
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, Jr.-voted to
overrule, or joined any opinion urging the overruling of, a
constitutional precedent.
The second significant pattern is that most areas of constitutional
law are relatively well-settled. These areas include not only the
constitutionality of legal tender and incorporation of most of the Bill
4. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
5. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 206-45 tbl.1 (2008).
Table 1 shows, inter alia, that in 133 cases, the Court has expressly overruled 208 of its
constitutional precedents. The difference between the numbers of overruling and
overruled cases is attributable to the fact that in many of the overruling cases the Court
overruled more than one precedent. Indeed, in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), the Burger Court overruled more than thirty
constitutional precedents. Id.
6. See GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 246 tbl.2.
7. Pennhurst skews the results of a survey of the areas in which the Court has
overruled itself most often. See id. at 233.
8. See id. at 12 (describing the explicit overrulings made by the Warren Court).
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of Rights to the states (through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause), but also landmark precedents upholding
fundamental rights of men and women to marry, the fundamental
right to use contraception, and landmark legislation on Social
Security, environmental protection, and civil rights.9
There are also numerous areas of well-settled constitutional law
outside of the courts. These areas comprise the domain of nonjudicial
precedent (nonjudicial actors' past constitutional judgments which
public authorities seek to invest with normative authority). ° A short
but illuminating list of stable, resilient nonjudicial precedents
encompasses such diverse constitutional subjects as the scope of a
President's pardon power, the scopes of the House's and Senate's
respective impeachment authorities and authorities to determine
their respective rules of internal governance, presidential succession,
the scope of a President's veto authority (or the grounds on which he
may exercise his veto authority), and the scope of the Senate's advice
and consent authority."
Third, there is strong evidence of the Court's adherence to
precedent as a modality of constitutional argumentation. For
instance, studies show that by 1900 the Supreme Court had settled
into the practice of citing and relying upon its precedents as
modalities of argumentation and sources of decision in at least ninety
percent of its constitutional decisions.12  The Roberts Court
steadfastly maintains this practice 3 : In every constitutional case
decided in its first two Terms, the Court claimed precedent as a basis
for its decision. When one examines the modalities of constitutional
argumentation (or sources of decision) employed by the individual
Justices on the Roberts Court, the same pattern holds for every single
Justice but Clarence Thomas. In every constitutional opinion in
which the other eight Justices wrote or joined, precedent was claimed
9. For these and other settled disputes, see generally id. at 44-46, 177-98.
10. For a more detailed discussion of nonjudicial precedent, see generally Michael J.
Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011505.
11. On the finality of these and other nonjudicial precedents, see generally
GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 131-35.
12. See, e.g., James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court
Precedent, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 16, 19 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008032.
13. My research assistants and I surveyed all of the constitutional cases decided by the
Roberts Court in its first two Terms to determine the relative frequency with which the
Justices relied upon the different modalities of constitutional decisionmaking. We
measured reliance on a particular modality as not merely a string cite to it, but rather as an
actual discussion of its relevance as grounds for the Court's eventual decisions. (Data on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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as a basis for the decision. For Justice Thomas, precedent was
claimed as a basis for the decision in all but three of the constitutional
cases he wrote or joined. 4 None of the other conventional modes,
such as text, structure, and original meaning, comes close.
Even more startling may be the relative percentages for each of
the Justices' references to, or reliance on, each of the conventional
modalities of constitutional argument. The next most common
modalities are variations of precedent. For instance, history
encompasses historical practices, tradition, and custom, all of which
are different forms of nonjudicial precedent (defined as any
nonjudicial actor's past constitutional judgments that nonjudicial
actors seek to invest with normative authority). Thus, Supreme Court
precedent was cited as a basis for the decision in all thirty-three
constitutional opinions that Chief Justice Roberts wrote or joined in
the 2006 Term, and historical practices were claimed as a basis for the
decisions in seventeen cases. In contrast, the text of the Constitution
was cited as a basis for the decision in merely two of the thirty-three
cases, while three of the thirty-three cases relied on ethos-the notion
of a national identity, which is, practically speaking, merely another
category of nonjudicial precedent. Perhaps tellingly, none of the
thirty-three cases claimed original meaning in support of the
decisions. The statistics for Justice Alito in the 2006 Term are similar:
in the thirty-seven constitutional cases in which he either wrote or
joined opinions, the Court's precedents were cited as a basis for the
decisions in all but one of the cases, and historical practices are cited
as a basis for nearly fifty percent of the cases (eighteen of the thirty-
seven cases). In contrast, only one of the thirty-seven cases actually
discussed original meaning as a specific basis for its decision.15
Even Justices Scalia and Thomas, contrary to the expectations of
most people, prioritized precedent over all other sources of decision.
Indeed, no other source came close for either Justice. For instance, in
the thirty-nine constitutional cases in which Justice Scalia either
wrote or joined opinions in the 2006 Term, precedent was a basis for
the decision in all of the cases. In contrast, historical practices were
claimed as a basis for the decisions in twenty of those cases, but
original meaning was cited as a basis for the decisions in only three of
14. See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007); L.A. County v. Rettele,
550 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 1989 (2007); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 856
(2007).
15. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007).
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the thirty-nine cases. 6 While historical practices were cited as a basis
for the decisions in the nineteen constitutional opinions written or
joined by Justice Thomas, original meaning was cited as a basis for
the decision in only five of those cases.
The Court's two newest Justices exhibited almost exactly the
same relative level of reliance on precedent in their first Term as they
did in the 2006 Term. The percentages of their relative reliance on
the different sources of constitutional decision are nearly the same,
with precedent being the only source claimed in each of the
constitutional decisions which they wrote and joined. Moreover,
rather than weaken constitutional precedents in his first year on the
Court, Chief Justice Roberts actually joined Justice Breyer's opinion
in Randall v. Sorrell,7 which expressly reaffirmed the Court's
embattled precedent, Buckley v. Valeo.18
The basic statistics do not prove-but strongly suggest-that the
deployment of precedent is more than strategic. If, as Professors Lee
Epstein and Jack Knight have suggested, everyone within the legal
system or our constitutional culture believed precedent did not
matter, then no one would bother to cite it.'9 The Justices persistently
ground or frame their decisions in precedent precisely because people
(especially lawyers and judges) believe that precedent does matter.
In other words, the omnipresent reliance on precedent is not merely a
universal cipher, but rather a reflection of the persistent recognition
of its influence in constitutional law.
The fact that Justices appear to manipulate precedent does not,
however, mean they do not respect it. Instead, the Justices merely
could be opting for one of several plausible constructions of prior
decisions, or the outcomes in particular cases could be hard to
reconcile because, as the product of a collegial or multimember
institution, they are likely to be inconsistent.2"
16. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.
_,127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007).
17. 548 U.S. __ 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
18. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In a separate concurrence, Justice Alito stated that the Court
need not have addressed the question of stare decisis because it had not been raised by the
respondents before oral argument. Randall, 548 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2500-01 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
19. See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1018, 1020-23 (1996).
20. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 903, 955-57 (2008).
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Last but not least, the Court's decisions reflect another resilient
norm in constitutional adjudication-one that I call the golden rule of
precedent. This rule provides that Justices generally recognize that
they need to respect the precedents of others or else risk having other
Justices treat their preferred precedents with disdain. Consequently,
Justices tend to pick carefully the cases they will challenge. Indeed,
one statistic suggestive of this propensity is that the Justice who urged
the overruling of constitutional precedents more than any other was
Clarence Thomas, who on average has urged only overruling 2.07
constitutional precedents per Term (from the date of his appointment
to the end of the Rehnquist Court).' It is plausible that, given Justice
Thomas's frequently expressed commitment to original meaning, he
is probably at odds with more than two constitutional precedents he is
called upon to review per Term; but he does not urge the overruling
of every precedent he deems wrongly decided. The other Justices,
including Justice Scalia, vote to overrule precedent urging overruling
only once per Term.22 None of these Justices appear to be strongly
disposed to overrule many precedents.
II. THE LIMITED PATH DEPENDENCE OF PARTICULAR PRECEDENTS
IN THE ROBERTS COURT'S FIRST TWO TERMS
For many people, the most significant achievement of the
Roberts Court to date might be its severe weakening of several
constitutional precedents, especially during the 2006 Term. In
particular, in three cases decided in the 2006 Term, the Roberts Court
ruled exactly the opposite from what the Court had ruled in previous
cases. For instance, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life23 ("WRTL")
the five-member majority of the Roberts Court held unconstitutional
a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that limited
expenditures by corporations,24 even though the Court had upheld the
same provision four years earlier. Similarly, in Gonzales v.
Carhart,26 (Carhart II) the same five-member majority upheld the
constitutionality of a federal partial-birth abortion law,27 even though
the Court had struck down a nearly identical state partial-birth
21. See GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 12.
22. Id.
23. 551 U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
24. Id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2659.
25. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 209 (2003).
26. 550 U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
27. Id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
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abortion law in 2000.1 Moreover, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation,29 the same five-member majority held that individual
taxpayers had no standing to assert an Establishment Clause
challenge to President George W. Bush's faith-based initiatives,"
even though more than forty years earlier in Flast v. Cohen,3 the
Warren Court had recognized that taxpayers had standing to assert an
Establishment Clause challenge to the constitutionality of
congressional expenditures. In yet another case, Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,32 the Court struck
down the voluntary desegregation plans of two municipalities in spite
of their similarity to what Justice Stephen Breyer described as the
"efforts that this Court has repeatedly required, permitted, and
encouraged local authorities to undertake."33
It is important, however, not to overstate the significance of what
the Roberts Court did in Carhart II, Hein, and Parents Involved.
First, in each of these cases, the Roberts Court primarily grounded its
decision on earlier decisions. In fact, the weakening of some
precedents in these cases corresponded with the Roberts Court's
adherence to, or strengthening of, other precedents. For instance,
while the Court did not overrule Flast, Flast had long been in tension
with a more extensive line of precedents in which the Court has
consistently rejected taxpayer standing to assert constitutional claims
against congressional or presidential activities on bases other than the
Establishment Clause.34 Hence, the Court in Hein was clearly
aligning itself with the separation of powers and other constitutional
concerns in which these latter cases were grounded rather than those
expressed in Flast.35 While the taxpayer plaintiffs in Flast and Hein
28. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000).
29. 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
30. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
31. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
32. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
33. Id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at
2811 ("A longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority tells us that the Equal
Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve
positive race-related goals ....").
34. For a discussion of some of the case law conflicting with Flast, see RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 130-31 (5th ed. 2003).
35. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-60 (1996) (holding that delays in access
to legal materials and assistance in the Arizona prison system did not violate the
constitutional right of access to courts and that parties were not actually injured by
legitimate delay); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 476-82 (1982) (holding that plaintiff organization lacked standing
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were each asserting Establishment Clause claims, the fact that the
Court had in other cases denied taxpayer standing to challenge
executive branch actions was also clearly important, if not dispositive,
to the majority.36
Moreover, the complaint that the Roberts Court unfairly
weakened some Supreme Court precedents fails to come to grips with
the generally limited path dependency of these precedents.37 There
are many factors preventing particular precedents from constraining
Justices from ruling as they would like.38 Among the most important
of these factors are the network effects of precedents.39 The meaning
of a precedent depends heavily on what subsequent Justices think
(and say) it means. The more a precedent is cited for the same
proposition, the more fixed its meaning becomes; however, the less
often it is cited (either at all or for the same proposition of law), the
less secure its meaning in constitutional law.4 In both Carhart II and
WRTL, there was but a single precedent arguably on point and thus
no opportunity to rely on a meaning of the case fixed by other
decisions. These two cases were the first opportunities the Court had
to determine the meaning and significance of Stenberg v. Carhart4'
and McConnell v. FEC,42 respectively. It should not be surprising to
find that cases with minimal or no supporting network of citations
have very weak or perhaps no constraining power. The absence of a
pattern of approving citations to the construction of a particular
precedent makes it easier for a majority to avoid adherence to any
particular construction.
because the transfer of federally owned property to a religious school did not satisfy the
Article III requirement of personal injury).
36. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984) (holding that parents of black
children attending public schools did not have standing to challenge the Internal Revenue
Service's failure to adopt standards sufficient to deny tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory schools because any injury based on inability to receive an education in an
integrated school was not traceable directly to the IRS' conduct).
37. See Gerhardt, supra note 20passim.
38. I hasten to add that the evident limited path dependency of precedent does not
make it unique among the conventional sources of constitutional argumentation and
sources of decision. For instance, in the hard cases that come before the Court both the
text and original meaning of the Constitution are subject to many of the same factors that
impede the path dependency of precedent.
39. See generally GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 109-10 (describing how the network
effects of precedent influences Justices' willingness to follow or to disregard that
precedent).
40. Id.
41. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
42. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
1288 [Vol. 86
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The extent and nature of a precedent's network of citations
influence the strength of its constraining power. Although a seminal
case may be seminal in part because it has substantial network effects,
the clarity of its significance and meaning in constitutional law
depends on the consistency and uniformity with which the Court and
other public authorities have cited it. In other words, even a seminal
case may not have much constraining force if the Court has failed to
consistently invest it with the same meaning over time. The more
often a case is cited for the same proposition, the more fixed its
meaning or significance in constitutional law it may become. But,
again, the corollary is also true-the less often a precedent is cited for
a particular proposition, the less certain it becomes for that precedent
to stand for that particular proposition.
This corollary helps to explain the Court's decision in Parents
Involved. There, the Court considered the constitutionality of
Seattle's and Louisville's voluntary desegregation plans, which
employed race as a factor in school assignments.43 The Court struck
down both plans and found that neither was compelled by its seminal
decision in Brown v. Board of Education' or its progeny, including
Grutter v. Bollinger,45 which had barely upheld the constitutionality of
a state's employing race as a factor in graduate and professional
school admissions. Criticism of the Roberts Court for not following
Brown and Grutter rests on the mistaken premise that these two cases
could only be read in one way in Parents Involved. While the case of
Grutter was too new to have any fixed network of citations, Brown
and its progeny have been cited, at least since the mid-1990s, to
support subjecting any race-based classification to strict scrutiny. 6
This is true in spite of the fact that Brown said nothing about the level
of scrutiny it was employing. Thus, Chief Justice Roberts in Parents
Involved claimed to be following precedents when he subjected
Seattle's and Louisville's voluntary desegregation plans to strict
scrutiny.47 There was nothing new about applying strict scrutiny in
Parents Involved; indeed, in Grutter the Court employed strict
43. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ., _,127
S. Ct. 2738, 2746 (2007).
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
46. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny in striking down the use of racial classifications to award federal contracts);
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to
strike down a minority set-aside program).
47. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at - ,127 S. Ct. at 2774.
2008] 1289
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scrutiny.48 Nor was it unreasonable for the Chief Justice to conclude
that the Seattle and Louisville desegregation plans at issue were not
narrowly tailored (even assuming they were supported by compelling
justifications).49
Yet another critique of the Roberts Court's handling of
precedent is that its willingness to weaken, if not implicitly overrule,
some precedents reflects a disturbing lack of candor by the Court.
Some commentators might protest that Justices such as John Roberts,
Jr. and Samuel Alito, Jr. should candidly acknowledge that they are
overruling earlier decisions rather than pretend that they are doing
something different."
This criticism is overstated. Indeed, it is antithetical to the
notion of judicial minimalism usually championed by Professor
Sunstein." The theory of judicial minimalism is not designed to
maximize candor, clarity, or elaboration in particular constitutional
cases. Instead, it is designed to do the opposite: to have courts say as
little as possible and thus leave ample room for democratic actors to
address a disputed question of constitutional law.52  Yet, the
complaint that the Court should have acknowledged it was overruling
a precedent in Carhart II rests on the assumption that the Court had a
duty to say more than it did. It is, however, unclear why the Justices
should be compelled to do anything more than what they did in that
case. It is plausible that three members of the majority in Carhart
I-Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Alito-were not
prepared to overrule Stenberg. They might have wanted to put that
question off to another day, or preferred to allow more time for the
Court and democratic actors to address the necessity of overruling
48. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
49. Where a precedent has been consistently cited-and even reaffirmed-for the
same basic purpose, its network effects may be hard to ignore. This seems to explain why
the Chief Justice joined Justice Breyer's opinion reaffirming Buckley. See supra text
accompanying notes 17-18. Buckley is older than McConnell or Stenberg and thus has
generated more network effects than either of those cases.
50. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalists v. Visionaries: The Real Divide on the Supreme
Court Is Between Two Kinds of Conservatives, WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
June 28, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/28/AR2007
062800991.html.
51. See Cass Sunstein, Implicitly Theorized Arguments in Constitutional Law, 74 SOC.
RES. 1, 13 (2007) [hereinafter Sunstein, Implicitly Theorized Arguments]; Cass R.
Sunstein, The Virtues of Simplicity, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 70, 70 (2006),
http://thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/63_b.pdf [hereinafter Sunstein, The Virtues of
Simplicity].
52. See Sunstein, Implicitly Theorized Arguments, supra note 51, at 13; Sunstein, The
Virtues of Simplicity, supra note 51, at 70.
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Stenberg. It is also plausible that the majority in Carhart II could
agree on the outcome but not all of its ramifications.
Of course, none of this is meant to suggest that anything goes, or
should go, when the Court construes its own precedents. To the
contrary, in any given case, the parties, lower courts, prior precedents,
and other possible authorities (through the creation of precedents in
various forms such as historical practices) help to frame for the Court
a relatively finite range of plausible constructions of precedent. But
framing an issue is not the same thing as deciding it. Once an issue is
framed, the Justices must still decide it, and that means they must
choose from among a range of plausible constructions of precedent.
Because there are no established rules to guide the Justices'
constructions of precedent, they are rarely constrained by a single
case unless it has a rigidly fixed meaning established by the Court
through a series of decisions. Unless a precedent has a rigidly fixed
meaning, current or future Justices have the latitude to choose which
meaning to invest it with. The critical thing is to figure out, for any
given case, the particular meaning of a prior case that the Court is
trying to reinforce or establish. The Roberts Court can, like any
other Court, try to invest a specific precedent with a particular
meaning or significance. In time, however, it is bound to discover, as
other Courts have, that it has limited control over what other Courts
do to its precedents. In other words, the Roberts Court cannot do
much to prevent the precedents it makes from being reconstructed by
its successors.
III. A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON PRECEDENT IN THE (RECENT)
SUPREME COURT
This final Part sets forth a normative defense of fidelity to
precedent (and particularly to the doctrine of constitutional stare
decisis). In this Symposium, Michael Paulsen has reiterated the
arguments he has previously made that the doctrine of constitutional
stare decisis has no constitutional legitimacy and is nothing more than
a set of policy judgments subject to regulation by Congress. 3 But the
doctrine-unlike my friend Michael Paulsen's attacks on the
legitimacy of constitutional stare decisis-rests on every conventional
source of constitutional meaning. First, the constitutional text
authorizes Article III courts, including the Supreme Court, to decide
53. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of
Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?,
86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1121 (2008).
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"all Cases ... arising under the Constitution."54 One may easily infer
from this language that the Court has the power to decide
constitutional cases, that a decided constitutional case is a precedent,
and that such a precedent is part of the supreme law of the land
unless or until it is overruled by the Court or displaced by a
constitutional amendment. A plain inference from the formal
amendment process required by Article V is that it provides the
exclusive process for formally altering the meaning of the
Constitution (presumably as found by the Court or other
constitutional authorities)." Second, the Framers and Ratifiers
regarded precedent as an important feature of the legal system they
inherited from the British and used in the colonies prior to
ratification. For instance, the Federalist Papers explicitly make
reference to precedent in the course of discussing constitutional law.56
Third, the doctrine of constitutional stare decisis is a reasonable
inference to be drawn from the structure of the Constitution. The
federal judiciary was one of the three branches created by the
Framers, and people generally understood, both before and after
ratification, that courts, in the course of discharging their duties,
produced and maintained precedents.57  Fourth, pragmatic
considerations-or concerns about consequences-support the
doctrine of constitutional stare decisis. A court's inherent authority
extends to taking into account the practical ramifications of its
judgments, including those to overrule-or not overrule-its
precedent. 8 Finally, historical practices overwhelmingly support the
doctrine of constitutional stare decisis. While it took almost a century
for this doctrine to finally take shape, the Court has consistently
recognized it as a permanent feature of the system of constitutional
adjudication. If there were ever a thing like superprecedent-prior
case law which is practically immune to reconsideration-the doctrine
of constitutional stare decisis would seem to qualify.59
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
55. U.S. CONST. art. V.
56. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("To avoid an arbitrary
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that [the judges] be bound down by strict rules
and precedents ....").
57. See Thomas Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to
the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 662-66 (1999); supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
58. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 576 (2001).
59. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006)
(defining the concept of a superprecedent).
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My last reference to superprecedent touches upon a feature of
the doctrine of constitutional stare decisis that seems especially
troublesome to Professor Paulsen. He is concerned about the Court
basing a judgment not on a correct reading of the Constitution but
rather simply on the fact that the Court previously had made that
judgment.' To be sure, I think the Court rarely does this.
Nevertheless, there may be several compelling reasons to regard such
a decision as constitutionally legitimate. First, even this kind of
decision is supported by all the conventional sources of constitutional
meaning.61 Among these, no doubt, are both historical practices and
pragmatic considerations. It is not an act of judicial policymaking to
take into consideration the extent to which deviating from a very
well-settled practice would disrupt our social order. In his
confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern that
overruling a precedent would be a " 'jolt to the legal system.' "62 It
follows that at least he, if not all other Justices, would avoid reaching
a particular judgment if he thought it would produce too great a
shock to the legal system. He and other Justices who share this same
attitude about constitutional stare decisis are acting well within their
inherent authority to consider the impact of their decisions on the
Court and society when reconsidering precedents.
Second, the point at which a well-settled practice becomes, by
virtue of being well-settled, practically immune to reconsideration is
the point at which that precedent has become a superprecedent.
Nothing becomes a superprecedent, at least in my judgment, unless it
has been widely and uniformly accepted by public authorities
generally, including the Court, the President, and Congress. For
instance, when Professor Fallon states that "[a] Court that today
overruled settled precedents and held Social Security or paper money
to be unconstitutional would exceed its lawful authority," he is
acknowledging that all public authorities have accepted, at least
implicitly, the constitutionality of Social Security as a settled matter.63
Some people may believe that Social Security is not constitutional,
but Social Security, at least as a durable social fact in this country, is
quite easy to see.
60. See Paulsen, supra note 53, at Part I.B.2.
61. See id. passim.
62. Liz Halloran, Roberts Backs Right of Privacy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept.
13, 2005, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050913/13roberts.htm (quoting
Chief Justice Roberts).
63. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1116 (2008).
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Third, another important justification for adhering to a very well-
settled precedent is that it promotes judicial restraint. Professor
Thomas Merrill makes this point quite nicely in defending what he
calls a "strong theory of precedent."' He argues, among other things,
that deferring to extremely well-settled precedent makes sense
because it "results in more judicial restraint."'65 Fidelity to precedent
provides, in other words, a neutral, external source of decision on
which a Justice may rely. If we are concerned about minimizing the
extent to which Justices ground their decisions on their personal or
policy preferences, one checking mechanism is precedent, particularly
prior decisions they did not create.
The strongest argument against superprecedent is that the Court
should always be free to reconsider any question of constitutional law
in order to ensure that the question is correctly decided.66 It does not
follow, however, that the need for the Court to have the discretion to
re-decide a particular question of constitutional law requires that
every issue of constitutional law be kept potentially open for
reconsideration. Our legal system would cease to work if it ignored
precedent. As Justice Scalia once explained:
Originalism, like any other theory of interpretation put into
practice in an ongoing system of law, must accommodate the
doctrine of stare decisis; it cannot remake the world anew....
[O]riginalism will make a difference ... not in the rolling back
of accepted old principles of constitutional law but in the
rejection of usurpatious new ones.67
Some issues need to remain settled to preserve a number of
important institutional values. These values include, among others,
preventing the squandering of scarce judicial resources, avoiding
social or political upheaval, treating similarly situated litigants
similarly, investing the law with relative predictability, and ensuring
the stable operation of the social, economic, and legal systems. There
needs to be something more compelling than a particular
constituency's skepticism about the correctness of an earlier decision
in order to license the risk of traumatizing the legal system. The
larger the constituency-the more public authorities who are
64. See Thomas Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 273 (2005).
65. Id. at 278.
66. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, No, It's Super-Precedent: A
Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 1249 (2006).
67. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 138-39 (1997).
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persuaded to reconsider some question of constitutional law-the
more public and social support there would be to allow a heretofore
well-settled issue to be reopened. Indeed, it is useful to recall that the
issues that are firmly settled because of longstanding precedent are
well-settled because both nonjudicial authorities and the Court have
heavily invested in their closure.68 Thus, a well-settled precedent is
not likely to be reopened without some strong or compelling
justification for disrupting longstanding social, economic, and legal
reliance upon it. The fact that there rarely are compelling
considerations to reopen well-settled precedents helps to explain why
so many of them are never reopened. The precedents which are the
least likely to be reopened because of the practical impossibility of
finding compelling reasons to reopen them are, effectively,
superprecedents.
More over, fidelity to precedent generally, and particularly to
superprecedent, constitutes an indispensable feature of "judicial
modesty," the notion advanced by Chief Justice Roberts, among
others, that calls upon Justices and judges to be respectful of the
opinions of others to the fullest extent possible and not to decide
more than is required in any given case.69 A commitment to judicial
modesty, which is more of a temperament than a methodology,
should entail both respect for precedent and a disposition to construct
precedent incrementally. The obvious benefit of such a commitment
is that it promotes judicial restraint, for it requires Justices to refrain,
in Justice Scalia's words, from remaking "the world anew."7° Justices
are challenged to be modest, to recognize that the risk of
disrespecting too many precedents is that it will merely embolden
their colleagues and successors to question their preferred
precedents. Put differently, immodest Justices run the risk of having
their challenges to the preferred precedents of others turned around
and employed in challenges to their preferred precedents. Modest
jurists, meanwhile, do not run the risk that the immodest jurists do of
having their own boldness used against them. Thus, the construction
of precedent is like a mirror: it will likely reflect what it receives.
The more respectful of precedent a Justice tends to be the more
68. See GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 189-90.
69. See Roger Citron, Process Makes Perfect: John Roberts' Marked and Positive
Influence on the Supreme Court, SLATE, July 7, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2145159
(describing how in his first year as Chief Justice, Roberts implemented what he had said
about the importance of judicial modesty in his confirmation hearings).
70. SCALIA, supra note 67, at 138.
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respect his preferred precedents are likely to receive from his
colleagues or successors.
CONCLUSION
In its first two Terms, the Roberts Court confirmed the duality of
precedent. On the one hand, it appears to be a social scientist's
dream, for in the most salient constitutional cases over the past two
Terms the Justices' deployment of precedent seems to have
consistently tracked their respective ideological commitments. In
adjudicating the constitutionality of federal bans on partial-birth
abortion and corporate campaign expenditures, taxpayer standing to
assert an Establishment Clause challenge to the President's faith-
based initiative, and voluntary desegregation plans, the same five-
member majority of the Court consistently weakened-and
rejected-liberal constructions of precedent. It was this Court that
Justice Stephen Breyer chastised when he declared from the bench at
the end of the 2006 Term: "It is not often in the law that so few have
so quickly changed so much."71
On the other hand, the Roberts Court is quite attached to
precedent. From an institutional perspective, the Court's treatment
of precedent merely tracks the historical patterns in the Court's
handling of precedent over the years. Among the most important of
these patterns is the fact that precedent has been claimed as a basis
for the Court's decision in 100% of the constitutional cases over the
past two Terms. The omnipresence of precedent as a basis for the
Court's decisions has significant implications for the study of
precedent because it reflects a widely, if not universally, held belief
that precedent matters. Moreover, when one considers the vast range
of constitutional issues that the Roberts Court has not decided (and is
highly unlikely to address, much less to reconsider), there is far more
stability in constitutional law than many critics of the Roberts Court
acknowledge. There are, in fact, far more issues of constitutional law
that have been settled firmly by the Court than have not. Even when
the Roberts Court weakened some precedents, it did so primarily on
the basis of precedent and in ways that confirmed the fact that
particular constitutional precedents rarely constrain the Justices to
forego certain outcomes or choices. It is not surprising to find that in
constitutional adjudication the Roberts Court has thus far confirmed
the limited path dependency of particular precedents.
71. Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2007, at Al (quoting Justice Breyer).
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The evidence legal scholars and social scientists choose to assess
the Roberts Court's approach to precedent might reflect our own
biases, preferences, and disciplines. To rebut this problem, I urge
that at least we maintain a strong commitment to employing an
institutional perspective on the Court, because this perspective
enables us to see what matters to the Court as an institution over
time. Based on this assessment, it is clear that precedent has, not
surprisingly, continued to be the source of argumentation and
authority that matters the most to Supreme Court Justices over time;
and it has continued to matter because it is a forceful, legitimate
constraint within the institution.
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